Abstract: This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is “no”. I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
Abstract: This paper concerns reductionist views about psychology and the special sciences more generally. I identify a metaphysical assumption in reductionist views which I dub the ‘Micro-Macro Mirroring Thesis’. The Mirroring Thesis says that the relation between the entities of any legitimate higher-level science and their lower-level realizers is similar to that between the entities of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. I argue that reductionism implies the Thesis, and that the Thesis is not a priori. It is more difficult to tell whether the Thesis is true, and I indicate some relevant considerations.
Critical Study of Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes
This paper attempts, with limited success, to use Patricia Cheng's concept of "causal power" to solve problems about overdetermination, preemption, and the like.
Medium-length version of a big project (July 2010).
Abstract: This paper suggests a nonstandard interpretation of the main argument for reductionism about special science properties, which I call the “No New Powers Argument”. The argument rests on a principle of ontological simplicity, roughly that there are no causally redundant entities. It holds that second-order properties “bring no new powers into the world”, so they would be causally redundant, and so do not exist (or are “unnatural” epiphenomena). I argue that the standard nonreductionist response to this argument amounts to a denial of the relevant simplicity principle: there are no causally redundant entities, except for ones that are metaphysically necessitated by physical matters. The dualist has an analogous response: there are no redundant entities, except for ones nomologically necessitated by physical matters. So, the standard response gives up on simplicity arguments against dualism. I offer an alternative response by attempting to spell out the idea that natural properties are “causal/nomic joint carvers”. This account has the consequence that second-order causes and effects are alike natural or not; they come together as a package deal. So, second-order properties can “bring new powers into the world” -- they bring powers to cause other second-order properties, which powers would not otherwise exist. The existence and naturalness of second-order properties is perfectly compatible with the relevant sort of ontological simplicity. I suggest, but do not argue in detail here, that this response allows the nonreductionist to maintain a simplicity argument against dualism.
