Introduction
The Return of Patriotism

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The abrupt end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, produced a major reevaluation of patriotism as a political and moral concept. For example, Francis Fukuyama wrote a widely discussed article in 1989 ("The End of History?"), asserting that the collapse of communism was evidence of the global superiority of both Western democracy and capitalism. He suggested that this victorious form of government may represent the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government" and thus constituted an "end to history." Fukuyama advocated a two-tiered policy response based on the fact that part of the world is now "post-historical" and the other is "mired in history." Realist principles of power maximization, military defense and conflict will apply to the Third World where nationalist, religious and ethnic antagonisms continue. Thus an international organization "much more like NATO than the United Nations" should act as a police unit to "protect its collective security from threats" while economic organization should be given attention in the "post-historical" sector, where war is "unthinkable" and disagreements will revolve around issues like beef quotas. Yet "The End of History?" nevertheless concluded with a more sober prediction. Despite (or more accurately because of) the absence of war and the final victory of liberalism, the future would be a "sad time." Fukuyama even expressed feeling of regret about the "end of history" and repeated a traditional conservative objection that liberal societies are diminished ones that reduce great visions to the profit nexus.[1]

Other analysts reiterated Fukuyama's position. For example, Robert D. Kaplan (*An Empire Wilderness*) took a Tocquevillian inspired journey through parts of America in 1998. Some of the sights he observed disturbed him, but he also wondered if the nation was undergoing the birth of a "new cosmopolitanism." Perhaps, he speculated, the new high-tech personnel in computer industries were becoming "post-racist;" perhaps Earth Day would replace Independence Day as a focus of patriotism. He concluded: "Just as religion slowly gave way to nationalism as the Middle Ages ended, nationalism…may slowly give way to a combination of traditional religion, various types of spiritualism, and loyalty to the planet rather than to a specific country." The next decade might see America "reinventing itself in a larger world by becoming history's first international nation…where the best and brightest of Mexico and other continents come to live.…" He quoted from the eighteenth century historian Edward Gibbon who believed that a "decentralized, pluralistic society with a highly mobile citizenry might survive forever."[2] When his travels, however, took him to the Third World in *The Coming Anarchy*, Kaplan discovered hollowed out nations torn by ethnic and religious strife. He wondered how "shallow" and "childlike" leaders and publics in the West who worshiped "entertainment and con-

venience" and had "no tragic historical memory" could grasp these developments.[3]

These two sets of predictions, one envisioning some states (perhaps evolving into supra national entities) enjoying prosperity and innovation including the invention of new modal personalities and others "mired in history" and driven to war by "tribal" conflicts, was subjected to empirical testing by social scientists in the attempt to validate the theory of "democratic peace." Democratic peace research has not yet discovered why democracies apparently never or rarely go to war with one another. Some argue that the apparent reluctance to use force in democracies can be traced to internal political structures. Political actors in democratic regimes must run a gauntlet of obstacles before declaring war. Cabinet members, opposition parties, and the electorate must be consulted and convinced of the likely failure of peaceful measures of resolving conflict. Others contend that compromise and negotiation are such routine features of democratic politics that these methods are extended to international disputes.[4]

Whatever the reasons for the democratic peace, the implications for the concept of patriotism were clear. As a normative category, patriotism no longer seemed to be as desirable a virtue as it might have been in the past. While patriotic sentiments are not exclusively correlated to societies at war, it is during periods of crisis that these responses seem most valued. If war were to be an increasingly rare occurrence, it is unlikely that attributes so often associated with patriotism such as sacrifice and intense devotion would be required of citizens. Moreover, the object of the patriot's sentiments, the nation-state in modern times, seemed to be dissolving or evolving into new forms. Both Fukuyama and Kaplan expressed concerns about the dissipation of these kinds of expressions, but both also suggested they were becoming anachronistic. In addition, in parts of the world in which international conflict as well as civil war were still prevalent, patriotism seemed to be an attribute of regimes that had not undergone the process of democratization.

On September 11, 2001, just twelve years after the end of the Cold War, a momentous and horrible event occurred that significantly altered these assessments. Writing shortly after the attacks, John Lewis Gaddis, a historian of the Cold War, wondered if the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the attacks on September 11, 2001 might eventually be regarded as a brief interim period.[5] Were the predictions of Fukuyama, Kaplan and the democratic peace scholars flawed? William Galston, for example, noted that "the terrible events of September 11, and their aftermath, have created a surge of patriotism and a new sense of connection between young Americans and their public institutions. For many, it is their first experience of public service as meaningful; of national leaders, local leaders, police officers, firemen, and their fellow citizens as virtuous even heroic. But no civic invisible hand guarantees that these effects will endure."[6] If this new surge of patriotism was permanent, however, what were the consequences? Is patriotism a virtue that, as Galston suggests, requires cultivation? If so, how are patriotic sentiments nurtured and what is the impact of this project on citizenship? Or does the cultivation of pa-

triotism extinguish or diminish other more deserving values? Is it possible that patriotism is a virtue in some historical moments and not others?

On the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks on America, the Center for the Study of Citizenship held a conference, "The Many Faces of Patriotism," at Wayne State University's McGregor Memorial Conference Center, designed by Minoru Yamasaki, the architect of the World Trade Center. Marc Kruman, the Director of the Center, delivered opening remarks and President Irvin Reid, President of Wayne State University, gave a memorial address. The agenda included presentations by Congressman David Bonior and Dennis Archer, former mayor of Detroit and president of the American Bar Association, discussions, a film, and a commissioned musical work. Scholars from the United States and abroad were invited to discuss these questions. This volume is one outcome of this effort.

I

Before September 11, 2001, Alasdair MacIntyre answered to the question, "Is patriotism is a virtue?" in stark and provocative terms. He defined patriotism in a more demanding way than a general love for one's country. For MacIntrye, patriotism required loyalty and preference for one's country over any others. There are, MacIntrye admitted, conflicts between morality and patriotism, but to MacIntrye the real tension can be traced to two different conceptions of morality. A universalist conception requires an individual to be indifferent to her position and her group identity. On the other hand, a particularist one derives obligations from her attachments to her group. To fail to acknowledge the latter leads at best to an "emasculated" patriotism since "in some of the most important situations of actual social life either the patriotic standpoint comes into serious conflict with the standpoint of a genuinely impersonal morality or it amounts to no more than a set of empty slogans." MacIntrye offered two examples. In one, a scarcity of resources places the survival of a nation in peril. In another, a group regards the raiding of adjacent territories as "an essential constituent of the good life" while their target population concludes that these people must be subjugated, MacIntyre concludes that a patriot would reject the position that competing interests and competing ways of life should be treated neutrally.[7]

MacIntyre's examples are not only eerily prescient after September 11 but also raise questions about the moral foundations of patriotism. In the months just after the attacks numerous writers developed positions that reflected or attacked his sentiments. For example, Victor Davis Hanson focused upon the heroism of the firefighters and police at the World Trade Center. Initially Hanson saw strong parallels between their bravery and those who were so courageous in America's past, especially those who faced the Depression crisis and who fought in World War II. "These selfless patriotic men and women," he wrote on October 5, "project a physical presence that harks back to an earlier age – one largely unseen on the national scene for the last half-century. Muscular, tireless, despite constant movement, a quiet confidence in corporeal strength – it is as if they

stepped out of Depression era post-office murals or faded water colors in long defunct magazines." The names of their units ("Ladder 28;" "Squad 41") reminded him of the World War pilots "wiped out nearly to a man at the Battle of Midway." Hanson was surprised that "in the land of Wal-Mart and Britney Spears" there are "still men like Lincoln and Roosevelt, with stern Grants and Pattons as their captains...."[8]

Shortly after, Hanson began to look for inspiration in the patriotism of the citizens of ancient city states. Modern liberals, he concluded, had lost some important insights held by ancient Greeks. Writers such as Thucydides understood that republics are frequently called upon to defend themselves against aggressors. War was recognized as a central and immutable part of human life. For Thucydides, individuals will attack others for "honor, fear or self-interest." Those who love their city must accept war as what Hesiod called "Zeus's curse" and acknowledge that they will frequently be called upon to give their lives or their sons's to protect their community. To Hanson, many Americans, including past presidents, placed too much confidence on diplomacy, economic aid, and other forms of conflict resolution as an alternative to war. In an imaginative essay ("A View from the Past"), he interviewed Thucydides about the war on terror. Using quotes from Thucydides's own works as replies, Hanson asked a range of questions about desirable strategy and tactics. When asked, for example, about what restrictions, if any, should be observed with Al Queda POWs, he has Thucydides reply, "...reflect on what they would have done if victorious over you, especially as they were the aggressors."[9]

On the other hand, Joan Didion suggested that America was moving into a period of political conformity similar to the early 1950s. "Fixed ideas" about the nature of the terrorist threat and appropriate responses crowded out any questioning in the months after 9/11: "Inquiry into the nature of the enemy we faced…was to be interpreted as sympathy for the enemy…." She even suggests that Americans have been reduced to a state of hysteria that has replaced reasoned responses: "This was a year in which it would come to seem as if we were plunged into a pre-modern world. The possibilities of the Enlightenment vanished. We had suddenly been asked to accept – and were in fact – accepting – a kind of reasoning so extremely fragile that it might have been based on the presumed return of the cargo gods." Americans, according to Didion, seemed to be looking for "omens" and "portents" and "supernatural manifestations of good and evil."[10] Richard Falk supported Didion's position and concluded that the attacks had revitalized "traditional nation-centered patriotism" that was leading to "blind love" on the part of citizens" and "fundamentalist nationalist imperial overreach" on the part of leaders.[11]

Contributors to this volume have joined this debate. While sympathetic to the efforts of Hanson and others to remodel patriotism from ancient sources, Walter Berns offers some caveats. Although the Greek city states have been attractive models to Americans, especially republican theorists during the revolution, their relevance is limited. The regimen of the Spartan citizen was not only harsh but "there was no freedom of speech in Sparta, no freedom of religion, and, needless to say, nothing resembling multiculturalism." Athens was

proud of its tradition of free speech but there was no separation of church and state. Nor, Berns reminds us, "was there anything resembling what we call 'civil society' or 'mediating structures,' the sort of private associations Tocqueville remarked on his visit to America." There were, instead, only the people and the city, and nothing in between." To Berns there are even more differences between the idea of patriotism in America, and that of both ancient and modern states. Employing the concept of American exceptionalism, he outlines several additional problems in formulating a theory of patriotism. First, due to the predominance of liberalism, more basic needs, such as protection of property rights, are seen as the primary object of government. Second, the separation of church and state, as well as the diversity of religious faiths, requires that patriotism be expressed in either secular or at least in highly generalized religious terms. Love of one's religion thus does not automatically transfer to love of country. Third, if American identity is primarily expressed in universal utilitarian terms, how can patriotic sentiment find expression? The Constitution, Berns, notes, is silent on the subject of culture, and does not even mention the word education, let alone moral or cultural education.

Given what Berns calls the "newness" of the American case, how can patriotism be formulated under these exceptional conditions? He contends the founders considered all these circumstances and concluded that American patriots needed to be remade each generation through civic education. Jefferson supported universal public education with an emphasis on political participation but, Berns argues, did not focus his energies on love of country. But who can speak of the country as a poet? Lincoln is, for Berns, "America's poet, the closest this country has had to the sort of poet Pericles would have wanted for Athens. By that I mean, Lincoln put his poetry – the beauty of his words – to the purpose of causing us to love this country for what it was, and is."

According to Berns, Lincoln provides two important anchors in the instruction of patriots. He reminded Americans that their national identity was dependent on the fulfillment of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and his addresses are framed in the words "only a great poet can speak." Thus Lincoln provides both rational and emotional foundations for patriotism, reminding Americans "of the cause that binds the generations, that freedom is more than being left alone, that there is a price to be paid for it, and that they are indebted to those who have already paid it."

Walter Bern's analysis attempts to provide an account of patriotism that acknowledges American exceptionalism. Yet while his model recognizes Hamilton's observation that America was not a nation of soldiers like the city states of ancient Greece, his prescriptions for educating patriots rely on memories of war beginning with the American revolution itself. Thus some writers have searched for other models of patriotism for Americans to emulate, especially in light of the events of 9/11 and their aftermath. Martha Nussbaum's concept of *cosmopolitan citizenship* has attracted considerable attention.[12] In "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" she argued that patriotism inevitably drifts into nationalism and ethnocentrism. While she admits that a respect for the rights of other peoples is taught in America, she asks if it is desirable for students to learn that they

are, above all, citizens of the United States. Should they not be taught that they are, above all, citizens of the world who happen to be situated in the United States? Like both Hanson and Berns, Nussbaum seeks models of citizenship in the ancient world. Nussbaum proposed a model of cosmopolitan education based on the insight of the Stoics. Americans would be taught that, while they need not give up their local attachments, they should think of themselves first as citizens of the world. She contends that cosmopolitan patriotism would both enrich our lives and help us better acknowledge our moral obligations to humanity.

Martha Nussbaum revises somewhat her earlier formulation in the essay in this volume. Previously, she noted that traditional patrioitism has always seemed more attractive than the Stoic alternative because it is more emotional and exciting than the rational, "lonely business" of cosmpolitanism. In "Compassion and Terror" she assesses the role of compassion in educating citizens. Framing her analysis in terms of two tragic events, the burning of the towers of ancient Troy and the World Trade Center, Nussbaum reviews a philosophical problem that has been debated since the time of Euripides. Compassion is certainly a crucial element in "shaping civic imagination" but does it not also carry enormous liabilities? Yet if patriotism is indeed a virtue some role of for emotion needs to be acknowledged since the position of the impartial observer places all individuals on morally equal basis.

Nussbaum too expresses her concern that compassion is a too unstable foundation that is likely to be applied selectively. She writes, "We think the events of September 11 are bad because they involved *us* and *our* nation. Not just human lives, but *American* lives. The world came to a stop - in a way that it rarely has for Americans when disaster has befallen human beings in other places. The genocide in Rwanda didn't even work up enough emotion in us to prompt humanitarian intervention." In order to address the selectiveness of compassion, she advocates cultivating an appreciation of what it is like to suffer great misfortune. According to Nussbaum, the treatment of what constitutes misfortune is remarkably similar from Aristotle to Adam Smith to present day writers. Those who suffer great loss such as the death of loved ones or serious illness through no fault of their own elicit a universal sense of sympathy from others. While there are circumstances that might lead us be less emotionally tied to those who suffer great misfortune such as a misplaced sense of responsibility, Nussbaum believes education that teaches what it is like to experience calamities can create a sense of cosmopolitan citizenship. The success of this effort would be enhanced too if a society did not overvalue external goods that give rise to envy and competition. Under these circumstances, commemorating 9/11 would extend beyond compassion for those who suffered in our towers but would "awaken a larger sense of the humanity of suffering, a patriotism constrained by respect for human dignity and by a vivid sense of the real losses and needs of others."

Both Berns and Nussbaum focus their analyses on the role of emotion in an account of patriotism. Berns is concerned with the relative absence of poetic voices to express patriotic sentiment in America, and Nussbaum is not certain

about our capacity to extend the compassion of patriotic feeling to others. Brubacker acknowledges her concerns, but he focuses instead on arguments for multiple and differentiated citizenship as a major potential obstacle to desirable political projects. Also, unlike many writers on this subject, he refuses to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism, arguing that there is fundamental ambivalence in both concepts. For Brubacker, both nationalism and patriotism are fundamentally "political claims" created to encourage people to identify themselves in particular ways in order to form new polities, capture and transform existing ones or solidify long standing states. Thus he regards both as a mixture of emotional and rational appeal, noting that while these claims can lead to xenophobia, militarism and exaggerated national pride, "unspeakable horrors" have also been committed in the name of other political claims about class, race, ethnicity party, etc. Despite claims that nationalism and patriotism are obsolete categories, Brubacker is suspicious of their replacements. Both cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, in his mind, must show that they too are able to perform important political functions of which nationalism and patriotism are capable: encouragement of political responsibility, support for redistributive policies and integration of immigrants. Only when individuals recognize that their identity is bound with their nation will they be civically engaged to an extent that they are willing to defend other citizens against policies of their own government. Brubacker, in fact, concludes that "it is no accident" that economic inequality has increased "during a period in which the left has been preoccupied with issues of identity and culture, and in which the general 'culturalization' of political rhetoric has made it more difficult to focus on underlying economic issues." Similarly, he argues that the efforts by "ethnopolitical policy entrepreneurs" to portray immigrants as members of a transnational diaspora rather than as future members of a nation makes it more difficult to act on cross-ethnic commonalities.

The essay by Margaret DeWeese-Boyd and Ian DeWeese-Boyd takes a different turn than both Nussbaum's and Brubacker's. While both search for universalizing features as valuable aspects of patriotic commitment, these writers move in an opposite direction. Basing their account on Wendell Berry's work, particularly his short story "Fidelity," they advocate a "local particular patriotism" of love – "not love of the state or its institutions, but love of one's place and those who dwell there." They note that expressions of patriotism after 9/11 had a symbolic and passive character. Americans were, as Amy Burke noted, "willing to wave flags but not hold hands." Berry describes such responses as emanating from an "abstract nationalist patriotism" that can easily become "degraded into loyalty to symbols or any present set of officials." The two competing conceptions are debated by characters in Berry's fictional Port William in a manner reminiscent of the conflict between Antigone and Creon.

The authors attempt to apply Berry's insights to different recent formulations of patriotism including Martha Nussbaum's. They also particularly note Jurgen Habermas's recommendation for a "constitutional patriotism." Habermas has been concerned that Germany's past (as well as those of other nation-states) requires a form of patriotism based upon universal democratic principles.

Habermas noted, for example, that German citizens responded in mass protest to the murder of Turkish born nationals in Molin by neo-Nazis in 1992 with placards that read, “We are all Turks” and “Munich: A City Says No.” To Margaret and Ian DeWeese-Boyd, the protests, however, reveal a particularistic element of compassion for families that led to the criticism of state officials who were charged with acting too slowing in responding to the crime. Without this aspect, universal principles, even democratic ones, become idealized and actual policies become immune from criticism. They conclude that “universals cannot produce the kind of affect necessary to power commitment to those principles. It is only through identification with particular others that such strong emotions and attachments are developed.” Thus, “the starting point” for an account of patriotism “remains with those particularistic attachments.” For these writers, all patriotism is local.

II

The hopes and fears of these essayists can be advantageously compared to analyses of historical moments in two different nations: post-apartheid South Africa and the United States in recent wars. The problems of cultivating patriotism and the problems of moderating patriotism once established are vividly explored in the remainder of the essays. Sakala Buhlungu reviews the project of converting an apartheid regime into a democratic model of patriotism based upon the commitment to create a “non-racial” society. The symbol of the nation’s first democratic elections as the “miracle” of April 1994, the figure of Nelson Mandela as founding father, the introduction of a new flag and anthem, and the use of sports and music as a vehicle for a new national identity have all contributed to a sense of patriotism for all South Africans. But for Buhlungu, these signifiers often seclude rather than enhance serious racial divisions in the new South Africa. He reminds us that non-racialism as an anchor for national identity was, in fact, an accommodationist strategy designed to avoid the discourses of both white supremacy and black retribution. This effort, however, has aggravated economic inequalities. Racial identities are reinforced by geographical isolation and the commitment to a “non-racial capitalism” has led to a “racialization of class.” In fact, the theme of non-racialism in general has in many cases aggravated de facto apartheid. Those who have “raised questions…are often accused of…seeking to ‘politicize’ or ‘reassert’ race.” Given these problems, Buhlingu argues for a new approach to non-racialism which focuses on the reduction and elimination of racial inequality as a patriotic motif. He acknowledges that such a strategy is not without risks. This project is likely to exacerbate divisions in society as least in the short term but, for Buhlungu, it is preferable to a “deformed and contingent kind of patriotism” in which symbols of unity are “inchoate and fragile.”

Gerhard Mare, on the other hand, looks at the commitment to South African “non-racialism” even more critically by questioning not only whether there is any “discourse that can mobilize all citizens” except in “fleeting moments” but

whether such discourse is even a desirable one. Efforts such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's attempt to create a national identity may have been a cathartic experience that gave victims of apartheid a voice and others a revelation of past horror. But they may not be sufficient. Even the basic symbols of a new flag and anthem serve to remind citizens more of the divisive past than of any new future. Attempts to envision South Africa as a regional or world power are, for Mare, even more problematic since they are so prone to manipulation by elites. Borrowing upon the work of Ernest Laclau, he calls instead for a new democratic social movement of the oppressed. Rather than "blindly following the road" that others have traversed, Mare asks, "should we create a nation?"

One of the themes of the essays by Buhlungu and Mare is the impact of patriotism on groups in a nation that have been excluded from power and hence are called upon both contribute to and display their affection for national goals from the vantage point of unequal power. As Robert Reich once observed, political obligations are bargains reached between differently empowered groups within a nation.[13] In *Jefferson's Pillow* (2001), Roger Wilkins explores the relationship between himself and his family and four of the founding fathers (Jefferson, Washington, Mason and Madison). His account of the quest for freedom by his fellow Virginians, both slaves and slaver owners, was animated by these questions: "Can I embrace founders who may have 'owned' some of my ancestors? Can I try to see them in their complexity and understand them—even identify with them? Can I see myself and my ancestors as active participants in a history from which we are too often absent?" Wilkins concluded in part that he was "enthusiastically patriotic" because he realized that "I don't need for this nation to be perfect in order for me to love it" and because "I love it because it is my home, and because all the touchstones of my life are here."[14] In the essay here, Wilkins reconsiders his conclusions in light of the events of September 11. He notes that despite his aversion to flags, he found himself placing one in the back window of his car the day after the attacks. His actions prompt him to consider his own family history in light of his feelings of patriotism. Wilkins notes how his parents and forebears struggled against racism and how he has attempted to honor their efforts in his own life through his own political activism It is this sense of struggle, derived in part also from the civic republicanism of the founding generation, that unites Wilkins with the past and with all Americans today.

Wilkins's emphasis upon patriotism as a sentiment that is displayed more by active participation than by gestures of support, is explored in two essays that focus upon America's previous wars. In her *Community of Suffering and Struggle* (1991), Elizabeth Faue focused upon union organizing in Minneapolis and analyzed how the labor movement used the themes of class struggle and masculine solidarity to create a working class version of American identity. In this essay, she examines labor's response to America's participation in World War II. She identifies several obstacles facing labor in this period. As a newly recognized group in the political arena, labor confronted charges that unions were not truly patriotic organizations and could damage the war effort. Moreover, union members themselves were suspicious that patriotic appeals were designed in part to roll back newly won collective bargaining rights. Like many Americans, they

were disillusioned by the failed promises of the last war. On the other hand, if unions refused or were unable to convince Americans of their loyalty, they faced the possibility of a general labor conscription and/or restrictions of protection during the emergency. Drawing upon archival sources from the United Automobile Workers and other unions, Faue reviews a range of creative efforts by labor to display its patriotism and at the same time preserve its capacity to continue to represent its membership in the workplace. Labor agreed to a No-Strike pledge and increased production quotas during the war but union leaders also attempted to present a version of patriotism that emphasized democratic values and civil liberties. Union members were portrayed in United Auto Worker pamphlets as descendents of revolutionary patriots who fought "so the American people might have Freedom, Liberty and Justice and be free of Oppression."

During World War II, Sidney Hillman attempted to capture the balance between support and criticism of the government when he announced that "no worker can be loyal to his union, if he is disloyal to his country. No one can say that he is for labor if he is not ready to defend democracy to the uttermost." Mel Small in his contribution to the conference continues the examination of this question in his study of protest against the Vietnam war. He affirmatively answers the question he poses at the beginning of his essay, "Can dissent during wartime be considered a patriotic activity?" and submits the issue of its impact on the Vietnam war to a detailed utilitarian calculus. He notes that the anti-war movement was a complex set of organizations with varied motivations and objectives. Some protesters objected to the war on moral grounds; other on the basis of national interests. Still others were motivated by prudential concerns about their own conscription or those of family and friends. Others had larger, even revolutionary, goals. Some favored immediate withdrawal of American forces and other preferred various strategies of negotiation. To Small, this variety, along with the sustained organizational commitments to stage massive protest rallies, was evidence of the movement's democratic character. Did the protests, however, shorten the war or even prevent its successful conclusion? Presidents Johnson and Nixon believed that dissent prolonged the war while at the same time they asserted that they were uninfluenced by the protests. On the whole, Small concludes that despite numerous strategic errors on the part of protestors, "the movement did significantly affect the trajectory of the war by influencing several specific policy decisions in both administrations, and more generally, serving as a brake on escalation, and thus saving untold numbers of American and Vietnamese lives."

The essays in this volume certainly illustrate patriotism's many faces. Should patriotism be defined to enhance universalistic concerns or is its particularistic vantage point the source of its virtue? Is patriotism a concept prone to manipulation by elites or is it a source of independent judgments by citizens? If patriotism is love of one's country, how is that love best expressed? Is such love demonstrated by fidelity, gratitude, compassion, remembrance, shame, dissent, or some combination? Love too can also generate expressions of anger, revenge, envy and domination, and these too are faces of patriotism. These many faces

certainly have appeared before the events September 11 and they carry the same responsibilities to understand them as in the past.

Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *National Interest* (Summer, 1989): 1-18. Fukuyama's critics thus disagree as to whether his theory is "triumphalist" or "declinist." See, for example: Frank Furedi, "The Enthronement of Low Expectations: Fukuyama's Ideological Compromise for Our Time" in *Has History Ended?: Fukuyama, Marx, Modernity*, ed. Christopher Bertram and Andrew Chitty (London: Avebury, 1994), 31-45; Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (New York: Routledge), 19940, 14-15.

2. Robert D. Kaplan, *An Empire Wilderness* (New York: Random House, 1998), 18, 327.

3. Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000), 183.

4. See Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) for differing views.

5. John Lewis Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One" in *The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11,* ed. Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 3-21.

6. William Galston, "Can Patriotism Be Turned Into Civic Engagement?," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 16 November 2001, 16-17 (B). For a less positive early assessment, see Daniel Harris who argued the prominence of "weeping eagle" pictures and other forms of "kitsch" surrounding the aftermath of 9/11 showed that Americans "no longer consciously experience on a daily basis a very acute sense of community" and hence responded peculiarly. Daniel Harris, "The Kitchification of September 11" in *Afterwords: Stories and Reports from 9/11 and Beyond*, ed. salon.com (New York: Washington Square Books, 2002), 219-20.

7. Alasdair MacIntrye, *Is Patriotism a Virtue?* (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 6.

8. Victor Davis Hanson, *An Autumn of War* (New York: Anchor, 2002), 59.

9. Hanson, *An Autumn*, 152.

10. Joan Didion, *Fixed Ideas: America since 9/11* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2003), 14.

11. Richard Falk, *The Great Terror War* (New York: Olive Branch Press), 129.

12. See: Martha Nussbaum, ed., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Samuel Huntington, "America's Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite," *National Interest* (Spring 2004), 5-18; Homi K. Bhabhi, "Unsatisfied Notes on Vernacular Cosmopolitianism" in *Text and Nation*, ed. Laura Garcia- Moreno and Peter C. Pfeiffer (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1996). Jonathan M. Hanson argues that a version of cosmopolitan patriotism was created in the years leading to World War I in his *The Lost Promise of Patriotism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

13. Robert B. Reich, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1991), 58-68.

14. Roger Wilkins, *Jefferson's Pillow: The Founding Fathers and the Dilemma of Black Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 142.