Jeff Grynaviski is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University. He has held previous academic appointments at University of Chicago and University of Connecticut. He received his B.A. in Government and Economics from William & Mary and his PhD from Duke University.

Professor Grynaviski’s research and teaching focuses on American political parties, the U.S. Congress, electoral politics, and quantitative research methods. His first book, Partisan Bonds: Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability, has appeared in Cambridge University Press’ Series on the Political Economy of Institutions and Decision. In this work, he examines the relationship between the activities of congressional parties, voter behavior, and congressional election strategies. Most provocatively, he develops the argument that there are possible electoral benefits from party unity that encourages congressional parties to work together as policy-making teams.

He has also published one series of articles on the estimation of quantitative research methods. The focus of this work is on the proper tools to be used in the estimation on non-linear models. He has another series of papers on the politics of the American South. This work has appeared in American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Political Analysis, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and elsewhere.

Professor Grynaviski has a number of on-going projects, including a book manuscript under contract with Oxford University Press, tentatively titled The Bailout Paradox: The General Government's Partisan Response to Fiscal Crisis Among the States. In this work, he demonstrates that over the course of American history, when Congress is called upon to provide economic assistance to state governments who are at risk of bankruptcy, due to some combination of poor long-run planning and difficult economic times, its response has been partisan. The paradox that he identifies is that many members of the House and Senate from the most distressed states vote against fiscal relief for their home states, while members from states that are in relatively good fiscal health support a bailout. In the manuscript, Professor Grynaviski explains why partisanship looms so large in legislators' political calculations and its implication for American federalism.

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